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AN INVITATION TO COMMIT FRAUD: SECRET
DESTRUCTION OF JOINT TENANT
SURVIVORSHIP RIGHTS
SAMUEL M. FETTERS*
INTRODUCTIONJOINT tenancy is the most popular form of spousal residential prop-
erty ownership in the United States.' Indeed, it is safe to say that
* Professor of Law, Syracuse University. I wish to thank Lisa Gayle Bradley, Esq.
for several helpful suggestions and for her able assistance in the preparation of this
Article.
1. See E. Clark, L. Lusky & A. Murphy, Gratuitous Transfers 921 (3d ed. 1985)
[hereinafter Clark] ("One of the most popular ways of holding property within families is,
undoubtedly, in joint tenancy.... [A]Ithough there is little empirical basis ... it seems
probable that the chief reason for so holding property is that it will pass to the surviving
tenant upon death without the need for probate."); Campfield, Estate Planning for Joint
Tenancies, 1974 Duke L.J. 669, 670 (1974) [hereinafter Campfield] ("Joint ownership of
real and personal property by husband and wife in a common law jurisdiction is so gener-
ally accepted that to hold property in the name of only one spouse is the exception rather
than the rule."); Griffith, Community Property in Joint Tenancy Form, 14 Stan. L. Rev.
87, 88 (1961) ("Of the husband-and-wife deeds over 85 per cent are to them both as joint
tenants, and the remaining 15 per cent are to one or the other or to both as tenants in
common."); Hines, Real Property Joint Tenancies. Las Fact and Fancy, 51 Iowa L. Rev.
582, 586-87 (1966) ("Starting from a base of less than 1 per cent in 1933, the incidence of
joint tenancy in Iowa rose to .... an average of 52 per cent of all Iowa land transfers [in
1964] .... "); Sterling, Joint Tenancy and Community Property in California, 14 Pac. LJ.
927, 928 (1983) ("Approximately 85 percent of recorded real property deeds to husbands
and wives are in joint tenancy form."); Stuart, Joint Ownership Before and After the Tax
Reform Act, 21 Ariz. L. Rev. 659, 659 (1979) ("The majority of residences are owned by
married couples who hold their property either as joint tenants or as tenants by the en-
tirety.").
Some authorities would appear to undermine this proposition by reducing substantially
the number of states in which spouses may hold property as joint tenants. Professor
William E. Burby draws the erroneous conclusion that because a substantial number of
courts have construed conveyances to husbands and wives "as joint tenants," as creating
in them tenancies by the entireties, that "[t]his conclusion indicates that husband and
wife cannot own property as joint tenants." See W. Burby, Real Property 223 (3d ed.
1965). Burby cites no authority to support his speculation. See id. From Burby's unsup-
ported speculation, Professor Thomas L. Waterbury states, as fact, that "[t]here is sub-
stantial authority for the view that a husband and wife, in a jurisdiction recognizing
tenancies by the entireties in real property, cannot acquire title to real property as joint
tenants." See T. Waterbury, Trusts and Estates 369 (1986).
There is no support either in the statutes or in the cases for Burby's speculation or
Waterbury's bold assertion of fact. My research has disclosed only 22 jurisdictions that
still recognize tenancies by the entireties. But see R. Cunningham, W. Stoebuck & D.
Whitman, The Law of Property 211-12 & n.8 (1984) [hereinafter Cunningham] (twenty
states recognize tenancies by the entireties); 4A R. Powell, Powell on Real Property C"
620[4], at 52-13 (P. Rohan ed. 1986) (no fewer than 25 states and possibly as many as 37
states plus the District of Columbia recognize tenancies by the entireties). Of these 22
jurisdictions, nine provide by statute that spouses may hold title to real property either as
joint tenants, tenants in common, or both. If spouses may hold title as tenants in com-
mon, there is no reason why they cannot hold title as joint tenants unless joint tenancies
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millions of land titles representing billions of dollars of capital invest-
ment are held in joint tenancy in this country. Yet these titles are seri-
ously flawed. Several rules of law relating to joint tenancy ownership of
real property, 2 to conveyancing,3 and to the recording of deeds,4 all well-
have been abolished in the jurisdiction. See Alaska Stat. § 34.15.110 (1986); D.C. Code
Ann. § 45-216 (1981); Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 509-1, 509-2 (1976); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§§ 381.120, 381.130, 381.050 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1986); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 184,
§ 7 (Law. Co-op. 1977 & Supp. 1986); N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 6-2.2(b) (Mc-
Kinney 1986); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-13.6 (1984); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 60, § 74 (West
1971); R.I. Gen. Laws § 34-3-1 (1984).
In ten other states that recognize tenancies by the entireties, there are unequivocal
judicial decisions recognizing the capacity of spouses to hold title to real property as joint
tenants or as tenants in common. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Simmons, 241 Ark. 242, 407
S.W.2d 105 (1966); Pace v. Woods, 177 So. 2d 779 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Thornburg
v. Wiggins, 135 Ind. 178, 34 N.E. 999 (1893); DeYoung v. Mesler, 373 Mich. 499, 130
N.W.2d 38 (1964); Davidson v. Eubanks, 354 Mo. 301, 189 S.W.2d 295 (1945); Dodd v.
McGee, 354 Mo. 644, 190 S.W.2d 231 (1945); Fulper v. Fulper, 54 N.J. Eq. 431, 34 A.
1063 (1896); Gorger v. Gorger, 276 Or. 267, 555 P.2d 1 (1976); Robb v. Beaver, 8 Watts
& Serg. 107 (Pa. 1844); Tindell v. Tindell, 37 S.W. 1105 (Tenn. 1896) (strong dicta to the
effect that husband and wife can hold title to real property as tenants in common); Witzel
v. Witzel, 386 P.2d 103 (Wyo. 1963).
The remaining three states, Delaware, Vermont and Virginia, have statutes that could
be construed as allowing spouses to hold real property as tenants in common. See Del.
Code Ann. tit. 25, § 701 (1975); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 27, § 2 (1975); Va. Code Ann. §§ 55-
20, 55-21 (1986). In none of these three states, however, have the courts directly passed
on the issue. In any event, this is hardly a basis for the claim that a substantial number of
jurisdictions that recognize tenancies by the entireties disallow spouses from holding title
to property as joint tenants or as tenants in common. As an original question, there is no
contemporary policy reason for not allowing spouses to hold title to real property by any
arrangement of titles they might desire.
The most recent survey of the current status of tenancy by the entireties is found in 4A
R. Powell, supra, 620, at 52-4 to -13, which is a complete revision of the subject by
Professor David A. Thomas. Professor Thomas claims that tenancy by the entireties is
recognized in no fewer than 25 states and possibly as many as 37 states plus the District
of Columbia. See id. q 620[4], at 52-13. All previous revisions of Powell claim only 22
states as recognizing tenancies by the entireties. See 4A R. Powell, supra, 621, at 685
n.7 (P. Rohan ed. 1982). Thomas also asserts that "in a few jurisdictions, a tenancy by
the entirety may be the only concurrent estate a husband and wife can hold." 4A R.
Powell, supra, 621[2], at 52-18 (P. Rohan ed. 1986). In support of the latter statement
he cites one case each for the District of Columbia, Massachusetts, Michigan and North
Carolina. Id. 1 621[2], at 52-18 n.13. None of the cases cited support his assertion. The
case from Michigan supports the opposite position. See DeYoung v. Mesler, 373 Mich.
499, 130 N.W.2d 38 (1964) (holding that spouses may hold real property as joint tenants
or as tenants in common). In addition, statutes in Massachusetts, North Carolina and
the District of Columbia support the position that spouses in those jurisdictions can hold
title to property as tenants by the entireties, joint tenants or as tenants in common. See
D.C. Code Ann. § 45-216 (1981); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 184, § 7 (Law. Co-op. 1977 &
Supp. 1986); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-13.6 (1984).
Another unfortunate tidbit of misinformation is the statement of Cunningham,
Stoebuck & Whitman that Illinois has abolished joint tenancies in land. See Cunning-
ham, supra, at 204 n.16. The Authors are misinformed. See Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 76, para. i
(1965).
2. Joint tenancy survivorship rights are subject to unilateral destruction by either
joint tenant without the consent or knowledge of the other. See infra notes 12, 20 and
accompanying text.
3. The law has long recognized that the juristic act in the conveyancing transaction
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established and salutary in their own right, can be used in combination
by one joint tenant to assure his' own survivorship right while defeating
the survivorship right of his spouse.6 In other words, one joint tenant,
while secure in his own survivorship right, can defraud his cotenant of
his survivorship right with impunity.
Take the case of H and W, a husband and wife' who own their family
residence property as joint tenants. H has a child, C, by a previous mar-
riage. Without W's consent or knowledge, H executes a severance deed'
and deposits it in his safety deposit box along with his will in which he
leaves all of his property to C. Sometime later, either weeks, months or
years, W dies. H retrieves his severance deed and destroys it. Because
only H knew about the severance deed and its destruction, H will have
no difficulty in establishing clear title to the property as surviving joint
tenant. If H dies before W, however, the severance deed will be discov-
ered and recorded. W will be unsuccessful in her claim to the property as
surviving joint tenant.9 Rather, she and C will hold title in equal, undi-
vided shares as tenants in common. 10
Outrageous? Of course! But, I submit, such is the law. If I am right,
either the law must change or the most common form of real property
ownership of family residence property in this country must be aban-
doned. This Article demonstrates that the complete, or nearly complete,
secrecy allowed in unilateral spousal severance transactions is a critical
flaw in the law of joint tenancy. In Part I, this Article examines the right
of unilateral severance in the context of secret spousal severance transac-
tions. It concludes that such transactions confer an advantage upon the
severing joint tenant never contemplated by the common law. Part II
analyzes the effectiveness of delivery in these transactions. It concludes
that the joint tenant's failure to record his severance deed raises serious
doubts as to whether he intended his deed to operate presently or only
upon his death. Part III proposes legislation that would eliminate the
potential for fraudulent, secret severance transactions in a manner that
preserves the flexibility of unilateral severance. Remedial legislation may
is delivery of deed, see infra notes 12, 20 and accompanying text, and the legal meaning of
delivery of deed relates to the intent of the grantor rather than the physical act of trans-
ferring the deed from the grantor to the grantee. See infra note 50 and accompanying
text.
4. A deed or other title instrument is valid even if it is never recorded. See infra note
44 and accompanying text.
5. For the sake of convenience, the male pronoun will be used throughout the article
to refer to the joint tenant who is defeating the survivorship right of the other joint
tenant.
6. See infra notes 27-37 and accompanying text.
7. The principal parties involved in this and subsequent examples and cases are a
husband and wife who hold their residential property as joint tenants. For the sake of
convenience, husband and wife will often be referred to as, respectively, H and W.
8. See infra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
10. See infra note 23 and accompanying text.
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be the only way to end these abuses in view of the failure of generations
of attorneys and judges to recognize a flaw so potentially dangerous to
title stability as to render joint tenancy ownership of real property unac-
ceptable to spouses, or, for that matter, anyone else.
1. SECRET SPOUSAL SEVERANCE TRANSACTIONS
Spouses who take title to their property as joint tenants assure them-
selves not only of survivorship rights in their property" but also of the
right of either spouse to destroy those rights unilaterally.' 2 In other
words, either spouse can terminate his own and his spouse's survivorship
right without the other's consent or knowledge. If either spouse effects a
secret severance without recording his severance instrument, he has,
whether he realizes it or not, created a situation in which he can termi-
nate the survivorship right of his spouse while retaining his own.' 3
A. Joint Tenancy Survivorship and Severability
Most law review articles concerning joint tenancy ownership of real
property contain extended discussions of its technical requirements that
owe their allegiance to the accommodations of feudalism, not to contem-
porary society.' 4 Repetition of that discussion is not required here. Re-
gardless of the long history of joint tenancy law' 5 and the gradual erosion
of many of its fundamental requirements,' 6 we should know that the only
reason for its retention today is its attribute of survivorship.'
7
11. See 2 American Law of Property § 6.1, at 3-6 (1952); 2 W. Blackstone, Commen-
taries *183-84; R. Cunningham, supra note 1, at 207.
12. See 2 American Law of Property, supra note 11, § 6.2, at 7-11; 2 W. Blackstone,
Commentaries * 184-87.
13. See infra notes 27-37 and accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., Spitzer, Joint Tenancy with Right of Survivorship: A Legacy from Thir-
teenth Century England, 16 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 629 (1985); Swenson & Degnan, Severance
of Joint Tenancies, 38 Minn. L. Rev. 466 (1954).
15. See generally 2 American Law of Property, supra note 11, § 6.1, at 3-6 (joint
tenancies have existed since the thirteenth century).
16. See 20 Am. Jur. 2d Cotenancy and Joint Ownership § 4 (1965 & Supp. 1986); 2
American Law of Property, supra note 11, § 6.2, at 9; 4A R. Powell, supra note I,
615[1], at 51-3, 616[3], at 51-6 to -7, 617[1]-[2], at 51-9 to -10; 4 G. Thompson, Real
Property § 1777 (Supp. 1974); see, e.g., Harris, Will Substitutes, 41 Ala. Law. 235, 240-43
(1980).
17. See Clark, supra note 1, at 921 ("One of the most popular ways of holding prop-
erty within families is, undoubtedly, in joint tenancy .... [A]lthough there is little empir-
ical basis ... it seems probable that the chief reason for so holding property is that it will
pass to the surviving tenant upon death without the need for probate."); Hines, Personal
Property Joint Tenancies: More Law, Fact and Fancy, 54 Minn. L. Rev. 509, 550 (1970)
("The co-ownership of today almost always involves a married couple. Reliable indica-
tors show that when a husband and wife own property together they intend a survivor-
ship arrangement in the overwhelming majority of cases.").
"Survivorship" itself is a misnomer. Survivorship does not mean survivorship in the
sense that there is a shift in ownership from the deceased joint tenant to the survivor.
Joint tenants hold title per ny et per tout, with the consequence that when one of two
joint tenants dies, his interest ceases to exist, leaving the surviving joint tenant with an
[Vol. 55
INVITATION TO COMMIT FRAUD
How the general public comes to "learn" of joint tenancy ownership, I
do not know. I suspect that most purchasers of family residence prop-
erty receive their introductory law course on joint tenancy titles from
their real estate agent who also assists them in executing a standard form
purchase offer, a standard form contract of sale and even assists them in
drafting the language of joint tenancy title to be included in their gran-
tor's deed. " I also suspect that most attorneys involved in real estate
closings rarely inform purchasers of the implications of holding title to
property as joint tenants. The attorney's role is usually limited to prepar-
ing and inspecting the deed and seeing to its proper execution at the
closing.
So what do the new joint tenants know about the law that pertains to
their title? They probably believe, at least for the time being, that they
are assured of absolute and inviolate survivorship rights so long as they
own their property. 9 Their expectations could not be more wrong, their
absolute title extended to the whole of the property. Sec 2 W. Blackstone, Commentaries
"183-85.
18. See Campfield, supra note 1, at 671 ("For generations married persons in com-
mon law jurisdictions have been counseled by bank personnel and real estate salespeople
to take title to real and personal property as joint tenants with rights of survivorship.")
(footnote omitted); Griffith, supra note I, at 89 ("Generally real estate brokers and sales-
men, whose legal training is to say the least quite limited, tell people how to take title
when they take the escrow instructions to the buyers.").
This can also be supported by way of anecdote, with not the slightest claim to have
engaged in any empirical research. In 1972, I purchased a house in New York. New
York recognizes both joint tenancy and tenancy by the entirety. See N.Y. Est. Powers &
Trusts Law § 6-2.2(b) (McKinney 1986). I told the real estate agent that I wanted the
granting clause of my deed to provide: "To H and W, husband and wife, as joint tenants
and not as tenants by the entirety." The agent advised me that this was not possible, that
spouses were required to take title to real property in New York as tenants by the en-
tirety. I told him to go ahead anyway and have the deed prepared as I had instructed,
that I would take my chances and would assume the risk. Unfortunately, this was not an
isolated incident. I have found real estate agents to possess almost limitless reservoirs of
misinformation on property law.
19. In other words, they believe that nothing can affect their survivorship right with-
out their consent. See, eg., Burke v. Stevens, 264 Cal. App. 2d 30, 34, 70 Cal. Rptr. 87,
90 (1968) (wife believed that there was nothing she could do to prevent her spouse from
taking their property as survivor of the joint tenancy); Delanoy v. Delanoy, 216 Cal. 23,
13 P.2d 513 (1932) (wife alleged that husband's conveyance of his interest was invalid
without her consent); Williamson v. Williamson, 90 R.I. 233, 236, 157 A.2d 110, 111,
(1960) (wife testified that "it had always been her opinion that a joint tenant could not
convey his interest without the signature of the other"); id. at 238, 157 A.2d at 112 (wife
testified that "she had always thought that a joint tenant could not convey his interest
without the other tenant participating in the conveyance").
Most couples who own their family residence property as joint tenants probably would
describe their situation as follows: "We own our home as joint tenants so that if one of
us, God forbid, should die tomorrow, the house would not be tied up in probate. The
survivor would own it outright." My experience in teaching property law for over a
quarter of a century is that it is difficult even for law students to grasp the concept that
there are a variety of different kinds of interests or estates in property, that there can be
concurrent and successive interests, and that these interests might be vested or contin-
gent. By learning to focus on these interests rather than forever looking for who owns
proverbial Blackacre, students discover that the process of analysis for solving property
1986]
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ignorance more profound. Their seriously flawed perceptions of their
property rights make them easy victims for loss or destruction of their
survivorship rights through fraud.
The reality is that either joint tenant can, without the consent or even
the knowledge of the other joint tenant, sever his interest from joint ten-
ancy ownership2" by any act that destroys one or more of the four "uni-
ties" required by the common law.2' For our purposes, it is sufficient to
recognize that a conveyance by either joint tenant destroys the unities of
"time" and "title," 22 converts each joint tenant's interest into that of a
tenant in common and thereby destroys each tenant's survivorship
right.2 3 Thus, it is in the nature of the joint tenancy estate that survivor-
ship rights are assured, but only so long as it continues as joint tenancy
property.24 Furthermore, it is neither wrong nor immoral for a joint ten-
ant who desires to terminate survivorship rights to do so without first
obtaining the consent of the other joint tenant.2 5 Because the interest of
problems gradually emerges. Most law students resist understanding that, by severing
the joint tenancy and turning it into a tenancy in common, the survivorship right is
thereby destroyed. Once the meaning of "severance" is understood as a destruction of
survivorship rights, and that either joint tenant may accomplish such destruction by his
own unilateral act, students find the law as hard to swallow as chopped hay.
20. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
21. See 2 American Law of Property, supra note 11, §§ 6.1-6.2, at 3-11; 2 W. Black-
stone, Commentaries * 180-82 ("The properties of a joint estate are derived from its unity,
which is fourfold; the unity of interest, the unity of title, the unity of time, and the unity
of possession ....") (emphasis in the original).
22. See 2 American Law of Property, supra note 11, § 6.2, at 7-11; 2 W. Blackstone,
Commentaries * 184-85.
23. See 2 American Law of Property, supra note 11, § 6.2, at 7-11; 2 W. Blackstone,
Commentaries * 184-85.
24. Spouses who discover the right of unilateral severance may find the estate of joint
tenancy more attractive. They may prefer the flexibility inherent in joint tenancy owner-
ship of property to the rigidity of other types of estates, arrangements of property titles,
or covenants, that assure indestructible rights of survivorship. For instance, in the
"twenty states," see Cunningham, supra note 1, at 211-2 & n.8, or in the "no less than
twenty-five and possibly as many as thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia," see
4A R. Powell, supra note 1, 620[4], at 52-13, that recognize tenancy by the entirety,
spouses may elect this form of co-ownership to assure indestructible survivorship rights.
In all jurisdictions, indestructible survivorship rights can be ensured by creating life es-
tates in common with contingent remainder in fee simple in the survivor or survivors of
the life tenants. See Durant v. Hamrick, 409 So. 2d 731, 737 (Ala. 1981) ("A tenancy in
common for life with contingent remainder in fee in the survivor differs from a joint
tenancy in that the right of survivorship in one tenant in common is not destructible by
the act of the other."); Swenson & Degnan, supra note 14 at 469 ("If an indestructible
right of survivorship is desired-that is, one which may not be destroyed by one tenant-
that may be accomplished by creating a joint life estate with a contingent remainder in fee
to the survivor; a tenancy in common in simple fee with an executory interest in the
survivor; or a fee simple to take effect in possession in the future ...."); L. Simes & A.
Smith, The Law of Future Interests § 1141, at 31 (2d ed. 1956 and Supp. 1985) (a cove-
nant not to partition may be upheld if reasonable and limited in duration to the period
allowed by the rule against perpetuities); see also C. Moss and W. Siebert, Classification
and Creation of Joint Interests, 1959 U. Ill. L. F. 883, 969 (1959) (regarding agreements
not to partition).
25. See Burke v. Stevens, 264 Cal. App. 2d 30, 34, 70 Cal. Rptr. 87, 91 (1968). This
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a joint tenant is a present interest in fee simple, it is not subject to a valid
restraint on its alienation.26 There is, therefore, no way to prevent a joint
tenant from effecting a valid, unilateral, nonconsensual transfer of his
interest that would sever his interest from joint tenancy ownership.
B. An Invitation to Commit Fraud
In the context of this Article, a secret spousal severance transaction is
one in which a joint tenant executes a severance instrument without the
consent or knowledge of his spouse and without recording it. -' Such a
transaction is a legitimate exercise of the joint tenant's right of unilateral
severance.28 Further, the law does not require recordation of the instru-
ment for the severance to be effective.29 Nevertheless, the severing
spouse's failure to record the severance instrument transforms an other-
wise valid severance transaction into a vehicle for fraud.
The severing spouse's failure to record allows the spouse to "have his
cake and eat it too." If the severing joint tenant survives his spouse, his
failure to record allows him to destroy all evidence of the transaction and
thereby retain his survivorship right. If he dies first, his secret severance
instrument will be discovered and recorded. His spouse, instead of ac-
quiring an absolute title in fee simple as surviving joint tenant, becomes a
tenant in common with the successor of the deceased joint tenant's one-
half interest in the property. In sum, the common law rules that ensure
the right of the joint tenant to sever his interest from joint ownership "
enable him to destroy the survivorship right of his spouse while retaining
his own.
There are three typical secret spousal severance transactions. One in-
volves a conveyance by one spouse of his interest in the joint tenancy
property to another family member, often his child by a previous mar-
riage." Another involves one spouse's conveyance of his interest to a
seems implicit in the joint tenant's right of unilateral severance. See supra notes 20-21
and accompanying text.
26. See 5A R. Powell, Real Property 841, 846 (P. Rohan ed. 1985) (in general, it
can be safely asserted that under present law, there is no way in which an unqualified
restraint on alienation can be effectively imposed on a legal estate in fee simple); L. Simes
& A. Smith, supra note 24, § 1141, at 30-33 (dealing with restraints on partition); id.
§ 1150, at 50-54 (dealing with Kentucky and Nebraska where some cases indicated that
reasonable restraints on alienation may be lawful, though the authors saw little signifi-
cance in them).
27. See infra notes 31-32, 34 and accompanying text.
28. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
29. See infra note 44 and accompanying text.
30. See supra notes 20-26 and accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., Meyer v. Wall, 270 Cal. App. 2d 24, 28-30. 75 Cal. Rptr. 236, 239-40
(1969); Delanoy v. Delanoy, 216 Cal. 23, 24, 13 P.2d 513, 513 (1932); Carmack v. Place,
188 Colo. 303, 304, 535 P.2d 197, 198 (1975) (en banc); Williamson v. Williamson, 90
R.I. 233, 234, 157 A.2d 110, 110 (1960); Schimke v. Karlstad, 87 S.D. 349, 350, 208
N.W.2d 710, 711 (1973).
In Schimke, plaintiff's wife conveyed an undivided one-half interest in the property to
her children by a former marriage without the knowledge and consent of plaintiff. Plain-
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"strawman," usually his attorney's associate, secretary or other em-
ployee, who contemporaneously conveys the property back to the sever-
ing spouse.32 The third involves the execution of only one instrument-a
tiff asserted that the execution of the deed without his consent or knowledge affected the
validity of the transaction. The court found this to be "immaterial, for a joint tenant may
convey his or her interest in the property without the knowledge or consent of the other
joint tenant, and, thus, plaintiff's wife was exercising a right she had as joint tenant." Id.
at 351, 208 N.W.2d at 711. In Meyer v. Wall, 270 Cal. App. 2d 24, 30, 75 Cal. Rptr. 236,
240 (1969), the court disposed of a similar protest that a joint tenant owes a legal duty to
his cotenant to disclose his termination of the tenancy. " 'Each cotenant, whether he be a
joint tenant or a tenant in common, may sell or encumber his interest in the property
forming the subject of the tenancy at his pleasure, regardless of the knowledge, consent,
or approval of the other cotenants.' " Id. (quoting Thompson v. Thompson, 218 Cal.
App. 2d 804, 807, 32 Cal. Rptr. 808, 810 (1963)).
A frequently cited case is Delanoy v. Delanoy, 216 Cal. 23, 13 P.2d 513 (1932) in
which H, a joint tenant with his wife, W, conveyed his interest by way of gift to his
mother without W's knowledge or consent. The court stated that:
[H] had the power to convey his separate estate by way of gift or otherwise
without the approval or consent of his wife. It also follows that upon such
conveyance the joint tenancy was terminated and the plaintiff and [H's mother]
became tenants in common, each the owner of an undivided one-half interest in
the property.
Id. at 26, 13 P.2d at 514 (brackets not in original).
32. See, e.g., Dean v. Auble, 109 Cal. App. 3d 156, 167 Cal. Rptr. 138 (1980); Burke
v. Stevens, 264 Cal. App. 2d 30, 70 Cal. Rptr. 87 (1968); Johnson v. Johnson, 1111. App.
3d 681, 297 N.E.2d 285 (1973); see also Riddle v. Harmon, 102 Cal. App. 3d 524, 529,
162 Cal. Rptr. 530, 533 (1980) ("The most familiar technique for unilateral termination is
use of an intermediary 'strawman'....").
In Dean v. Auble, 109 Cal. App. 3d 156, 167 Cal. Rptr. 138 (1980), W went through a
strawman conveyance and reconveyance, three weeks before her death, for the sole pur-
pose of destroying the joint tenancy. Id. at 158, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 139. H was unaware of
the transaction. Id. After W's death, H commenced a quiet title action, claiming to own
the property in question as surviving joint tenant. Id. It would be difficult to discover a
case more emphatic in its statement of the legal efficacy of the severance transaction.
"Plaintiff's appeal from the judgment in the quiet title proceeding, viewed in the light of
the common law and statutory history of joint tenancy, is frivolous." Id. at 159, 167 Cal.
Rptr. at 140 (citation omitted). The court went on to state:
It is indisputable that each joint tenant, for whatever reason, has the power to
convey his or her separate estate without the knowledge or consent of the other
joint tenant, thereby destroying the joint tenancy. The tenancy may be de-
stroyed unilaterally by conveyance to a "straw man" grantee and the convey-
ance back to the grantor. In such circumstances, the joint tenancy is not
revived. The former joint tenants become tenants in common.
Id. at 159-60, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 140 (citations omitted).
In Johnson v. Johnson, 11 111. App. 3d 681, 297 N.E.2d 285 (1973), H, by quitclaim
deed, conveyed his one-half interest in the joint tenancy property to his attorney who
then reconveyed it by quitclaim deed to H and D, H's daughter by a previous marriage.
Id. at 682, 297 N.E.2d at 287. W learned of the straw party severance transaction after
H's death. Id. The court held that W and D held title to the property as tenants in
common. Id. at 684, 297 N.E.2d at 288. The court stated:
The deprivation of [W's] expectation by a deed or gift is not vulnerable to at-
tack unless the transaction is a sham, colorable or illusory and tantamount to a
fraud.... It was [H's] privilege to make a gift to his daughter. There was no
evidence that the conveyances by which he made [D] a joint tenant in an undi-
vided one-half interest in the realty were illusory or shams.
Id. at 684, 297 N.E.2d at 288 (citation omitted).
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"severance deed" or "Declaration of Election to Sever Survivorship of
Joint Tenancy" 3-that has the legal effect of terminating the joint ten-
ancy. 34 The manner of severance chosen makes little difference in most
33. A "severance deed," which is executed by only one of the two joint tenants, has
the legal effect of terminating the joint tenancy, destroying survivorship rights, but pre-
serving spousal ownership as tenants in common. See, eg., Riddle v. Harmon, 102 Cal.
App. 3d 524, 530-31, 162 Cal. Rptr. 530, 534 (1980) (holding that severance without a
"strawman" effectively severs the joint tenancy). This was impossible at common law and
is still impossible today in most states. See id. at 527, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 532; Nelson v.
Davis, 592 P.2d 594 (Utah 1979). A growing number of states, however, now recognize
that what could not be accomplished by the use of one instrument at common law is
acceptable today. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Chandler, 140 Cal. App. 3d 709, 712, 189 Cal.
Rptr. 651, 653 (1983); Riddle v. Harmon, 102 Cal. App. 3d 524, 531, 162 Cal. Rptr. 530,
534 (1980); Hendrickson v. Minneapolis Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 281 Minn. 462, 161
N.W.2d 688 (1968). In Riddle v. Harmon, 102 Cal. App. 3d 524, 162 Cal. Rptr. 530
(1980), a California court allowed, for the first time, a single deed severance of a joint
tenancy thus dispensing with the requirement of the strawman conveyance and reconvey-
ance, observing that such practices were the product of obsolete vestiges of the English
feoffment ceremony requiring both a feoffor and feoffee. See id. at 528-29, 162 Cal. Rptr.
at 533. "Handing oneself a dirt clod is ungainly," the court said. Id. at 529, 162 Cal.
Rptr. at 533.
I think I might understand a formal ceremony on the land itself which required me to
transfer a clod of dirt from my left to my right hand to effect a transfer of title more
readily than signing a two-party deed where my name appears as both parties to the
conveyance. I know I would better understand an instrument entitled "Declaration of
Election to Sever Survivorship of Joint Tenancy," which was approved by the Minnesota
Supreme Court. to effect a unilateral termination of spousal joint tenancy ownership in
that state. See Hendrickson v. Minneapolis Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 281 Minn. 462, 161
N.W.2d 688 (1968).
34. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Chandler, 140 Cal. App. 3d 709, 712, 189 Cal. Rptr. 651,
653 (1983); Riddle v. Harmon, 102 Cal. App. 3d 524, 162 Cal. Rptr. 530 (1980); Hen-
drickson v. Minneapolis Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 281 Minn. 462, 161 N.W.2d 688 (1968).
In Riddle v. Harmon, 102 Cal. App. 3d 524, 162 Cal. Rptr. 530 (1980), W's "attorney
prepared a grant deed whereby [W] granted to herself an undivided one-half interest in
the [property owned by herself and H as joint tenants]". Id. at 526, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 531.
On the same date, Wexecuted her will. She died twenty days later. Id. No mention was
made of whether the deed was recorded or whether H knew of the deed prior to W's
death. That H did not know seems to have been the case because the Court stated that
"[an] indisputable right of each joint tenant is the power to convey his or her separate
estate by way of gift or otherwise without the knowledge or consent of the other joint
tenant and to thereby terminate the joint tenancy." Id. at 527, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 531.
Relying upon Riddle in a case where it was clear that the single severance deed was not
recorded and that the surviving spouse did not learn of the deed prior to her husband's
death, the California Court of Appeal observed:
How [severance] was accomplished makes no practical difference to the survi-
vor. She would be in no different position if the decedent had secretly used a
strawman. That too would have been unknown to her. Nonetheless, it would
have had the same result as accomplished by the unilateral act, i.e. a breaking of
the joint tenancy.
Carpenter v. Chandler, 140 Cal. App. 3d 709, 712, 189 Cal. Rptr. 651, 653 (1983).
In Hendrickson v. Minneapolis Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 281 Minn. 462, 161 N.W.2d
688 (1968), H executed a "Declaration of Election to Sever Survivorship of Joint Ten-
ancy." Id. at 463, 161 N.W.2d at 689. On that same date, he executed his will leaving his
interest in the property to his daughter by a previous marriage. Id. at 463, 161 N.W.2d at
690. He died two months later. Id. After H's death, IV made an application to register
title in her name as fee owner. Id. Daughter then appeared and asserted her claim as a
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situations, since, in each type of severance, the transaction is likely to
remain secret. But the elimination of potential witnesses to the severance
transaction afforded by the single-party severance instrument strengthens
the hand of the person whose interests are better served by secrecy. The
single-party severance deed might also help the severing spouse's attor-
ney sanitize and insulate himself from his client's acts.
Given the apparent ignorance of most joint tenants of their right of
unilateral severance,35 it would seem that the attorney directs the entire
severance transaction in most instances. 36 The joint tenant already is
surprised to learn from his attorney that joint tenancy survivorship rights
are not absolute and inviolate, but can be destroyed unilaterally and
without his spouse's knowledge. He is now introduced to another layer
of complexity, the inscrutable severance instruments themselves. The
single deed he signs with his name typed in as both grantor and grantee
is, no doubt, just as confusing to him as the strawman exchange of deeds
between himself and his attorney's legal secretary. In all of this confu-
sion, the joint tenant might not be aware of the advantageous posture he
now enjoys.
Nonetheless, once the severing joint tenant is faced with the death of
his spouse, he cannot avoid being aware of his power to claim as surviv-
ing joint tenant simply by destroying the unrecorded severance instru-
ment. His spouse's death presents him with an almost irresistible
invitation to commit fraud by destroying the severance instrument. 37 It
is only when the severing spouse dies first that his secret is revealed.
tenant in common. Id. It seems that Wwas unaware of the "declaration" until after H's
death. The court held it to be a valid severance of the joint tenancy. See id. at 465, 161
N.W.2d at 690.
35. One can reasonably infer such ignorance from their surprise when they discover
that the right of unilateral severance has been used to destroy their survivorship right.
See supra note 19 and accompanying text. It can also be inferred from the way spouses
learn about joint tenancy-through real estate agents. See supra note 18 and accompany-
ing text. Finally, it seems evident from the fact that most spouses intend a survivorship
arrangement when they own property as joint tenants. See supra note 17 and accompany-
ing text.
36. This is well illustrated by the case of Burke v. Stevens, 264 Cal. App. 2d 30, 70
Cal. Rptr. 87 (1968). See infra notes 87-125 and accompanying text.
37. Perhaps the best illustration of the power of temptation in these circumstances is
the case of a severing joint tenant who has already recorded the severing instrument. In
Minonk State Bank v. Grassman, 95 111. 2d 392, 447 N.E.2d 822 (1983), one of two sisters
holding property as joint tenants executed and recorded a single severance deed without
the knowledge or consent of the other. Id. at 393, 447 N.E.2d at 823. The non-severing
sister died five years later. Minonk State Bank v. Grassman, 103 III. App. 3d 1106. 1107,
432 N.E.2d 386, 387 (1982), aff'd, 95 I1l. 2d 392, 447 N.E.2d 822 (1983). In defense
against a suit by the administrator of the non-severing sister's estate, the surviving sister
argued that her single severance deed, which she herself had executed and recorded, did
not constitute a valid severance of the joint tenancy. See Minonk State Bank v. Grass-
man, 95 I11. 2d 392, 394, 447 N.E.2d 822, 823 (1983). The court dismissed her claim and
held the severance to be valid. See id. at 396, 447 N.E.2d at 824. Given her desire to
invalidate the deed despite recordation, it seems reasonable to assume that the deed
would never have been discovered if she had not recorded the deed.
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Even then, it can only inure to his benefit. It cannot harm him, at least
in the sense that if his scheme fails, he has lost nothing he would not have
lost anyway.
II. DELIVERY AND RECORDATION
After completing the formal, legal requirements for secretly severing
his interest from joint tenancy ownership,"8 the severing joint tenant is
then in a position to maintain his own survivorship right and to defeat
the survivorship right of his joint tenant.39 Although this situation was
never contemplated by the common law,40 most courts have found noth-
ing wrong with secret severance transactions.4'
In upholding the validity of these transactions, the courts have applied
traditional conveyancing and recording principles42 that are sound and
appropriate in the context of ordinary real estate transactions, but that
are wholly inappropriate in the context of secret joint tenant severance
transactions. An examination of these transactions reveals a relationship
between the failure to record the severance deed and the requisite intent
for an effective inter vivos conveyance.
A. A Question of Intent
It is fundamental to the law of conveyancing that delivery of the deed
is essential for an effective transfer of an interest in land"a and that its
recordation is not.' Delivery is the juristic act in the conveyancing
transaction.
38. See infra notes 43-63 and accompanying text.
39. See supra notes 27-37 and accompanying text.
40. The common law rules ensured a joint tenant's unrestricted right or severance, see
supra notes 20-26, 30 and accompanying text, not his right to defraud his spouse. See
infra note 123 and accompanying text.
41. See supra notes 31-32, 34 and accompanying text and infra notes 68-78, 89-125
and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 65-125 and accompanying text.
43. See 3 American Law of Property, § 12.64, at 311-12 (1952); R. Boyer, Survey of
the Law of Property, ch. 19, at 415 (3d ed. 1981); W. Burby, supra note 1, § 121, at 293
(3d ed. 1965); Cunningham, supra note 1, § 11.3, at 732; 6A R. Powell, Real Property
1891, at 81-95 (P. Rohan ed. 1984).
44. See Cunningham, supra note 1, § 11.9, at 776 ("In general, no one is obliged to
record anything, and there is no direct penalty if a conveyance goes unrecorded. As
between the original parties, an instrument is fully binding whether it is recorded or
not.") (footnote omitted); 6A R. Powell, supra note 43, f 904[3], at 82-14 ("[T]itle to real
property may be transferred by delivery of a deed without recording."); Swenson &
Degnan, supra note 14, at 482 ("Even if unrecorded, [a severance deed] is probably valid
[against the surviving tenant] since the surviving tenant may not be a purchaser under the
recording act."); see also Carmack v. Place, 188 Colo. 303, 305, 535 P.2d 197, 198 (1975)
(en banc) ("Failure to record a deed until after the grantor's death has no effect upon an
otherwise valid conveyance."). But see Md. Real Prop. Code Ann. § 3-101 (1981) ("No
estate ... or deed may pass or take effect unless the deed granting it is executed and
recorded."); J. Cribbet & C. Johnson, Property 1380 (5th ed. 1984) ("Two or three states
have an express statutory provision that instruments of conveyance are void until re-
corded, but it is not clear how such a provision would be interpreted by the courts.").
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Delivery of deed is to inter vivos transfers of land as death is to testa-
mentary devises. An undelivered deed is similar to a will. During the
lifetime of the grantor of an undelivered deed45 and during the lifetime of
the testator, 46 no interests are transferred to the person or persons desig-
nated in their respective instruments of transfer. At their respective
deaths, however, the difference between the undelivered deed and the will
is dramatic. At the testator's death, his will becomes an instrument of
transfer for the first time.47 At the death of the grantor of an undelivered
deed, his deed loses its ability to operate as an instrument of transfer.48
Delivery of the deed is an inter vivos juristic act.49 Hence, the deed is a
nullity if not delivered during the lifetime of the grantor. Even if the
deed finds its way into the hands of the grantee after the grantor's death,
title still does not pass. Dead people cannot deliver deeds. Inter vivos
transactions can be accomplished only during life.
For an effective delivery, the grantor must intend to effect a present
transfer of his property interest; he must intend his deed to be presently
operative as a deed.5° Hence, even if the deed were manually delivered
from the grantor to the grantee, there would be no delivery where the
grantor intends for his instrument to be operative only upon his death.5'
Under such circumstances, the transaction fails as an inter vivos transfer,
and probably will fail as a testamentary devise because deeds are seldom
executed with the formalities required by the statute of wills.52 In the
case of joint tenants, such a deed will fail as an attempted testamentary
disposition even if the deed's execution fulfills the requirements of the
applicable wills act.53 Failure of the deed to effect a severance of the joint
45. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
46. See T. Atkinson, Law of Wills 1 (2d ed. 1953) (defining a will as being "operative
for no purpose until ... death"). Some states define wills by statute. See, e.g., N.Y. Est.
Powers & Trusts Law § 1-2.18 (McKinney 1981).
47. See T. Atkinson, supra note 46, at 2.
48. See 3 American Law of Property, supra note 43, § 12.64, at 311.12. See supra
note 43 and accompanying text.
49. See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
50. See 3 American Law of Property, supra note 43, § 12.64, at 312; Cunningham,
supra note 1, § 11.3, at 732; 6A R. Powell, supra note 43, 11 891, at 81-95 to -96.
51. See 3 American Law of Property, supra note 43, § 12.66, at 317 (When deed is
delivered to grantee, "the fact of the reservation shows a lack of intention to transfer... a
present ... estate and the deed is held to be inoperative for lack of delivery."); R. Boyer,
supra note 43, at 416 (delivery not effective without requisite intent); W. Burby. supra
note 1, at 297-98; Cunningham, supra note 1, at 732 (physical transfer of deed without
requisite intent does not constitute delivery); 6A R. Powell, supra note 43, IT 891. at 81-
97; 8 G. Thompson, Real Property § 4234, at 70 (1963); 4 H. Tiffany, Real Property
§ 1034, at 361 (3rd ed. 1975).
52. See T. Atkinson, supra note 46, at 188, 189 (how deeds commonly fail to measure
up as wills); W. Burby, supra note 1, at 298 ("Ownership did not pass under the will
because the deed formed no part of the will."); Cunningham, supra note I. at 733 (wills
require attestation though deeds do not). Compare T. Atkinson, supra note 46. at 291-
348 (minimal formalities required of a will) with 6A R. Powell, supra note 43, 4 881-892
(minimal formalities required of a deed).
53. See Cunningham, supra note 1, at 733.
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tenant's interest during his lifetime leaves him with no interest at his
death.54 The surviving joint tenant's survivorship right cannot be de-
feated by the deceased joint tenant's will."
Although it would be a rare case indeed, the converse of manual deliv-
ery without the requisite intent is retention of the deed by the grantor but
with the intent that his deed should operate immediately to vest title in
the grantee.56 It is clear that in such a case there is an effective deliv-
ery. 7 "[A]s a deed may be delivered to the partie without words," Lord
Coke stated, "so may a deed be delivered by words without any act of
deliverie. "58
Such a transaction would, no doubt, be difficult to prove. Yet, intent
in reference to delivery of deeds is no different from intent in other areas
54. In discussing the delivery problem encountered in gratuitous family transfers, the
authors of the only new property hornbook published in several decades state:
The essential problem is that the grantor has attempted to use the deed as a will.
An intent that the instrument take effect at the maker's death is perfectly appro-
priate to a will, but it will not do for a deed at all; what is required for delivery
of a deed is intent that some interest be transferred immediately.
Cunningham, supra note 1, at 733 (emphasis in original).
While the above statements are correct, the following are not.
Much of the controversy would be swept away if the requisite formalities for
deeds and wills were the same. It would then make little difference, in terms of
ultimate validity, whether or not the grantor intended an immediate transfer,
for the courts could enforce the deed as a will. But the formalities do differ
rather drastically. In particular, deeds require no attestation by witnesses in
most states, while wills require attestation of a particular rigorous kind. Hence
an instrument which fails as a deed for lack of delivery can seldom be treated as
a valid will even if the grantor's intent would be carried out by doing so.
Id. at 733 (footnotes omitted). The second sentence of their statement is not only mis-
leading, it is wrong. A deed that was not intended for immediate transfer could not be
enforced as a will even if the formalities for deeds and wills were the same. The deed
cannot have any effect at all because the joint tenant has nothing to convey at the time of
his death. Without delivery of deed there is no severance of the joint tenancy, see supra
notes 12, 20-22 and accompanying text, and the joint tenant's interest ceases to exist upon
his death. See 2 W. Blackstone, Commentaries * 183-85. See supra note 55 and accompa-
nying text. Thus, a joint tenant's severance deed either operates as a deed or it operates
not at all. The instrument's compliance with the formal requirements of the wills acts is
wholly irrelevant. By treating a severance deed as a valid will, the grantor's intent would
not be carried out by doing so. See infra note 92 and accompanying text.
55. See 4A R. Powell, supra note 1, 617[3], at 51-11 ("A joint tenant may not devise
his interest in the joint tenancy, because if another cotenant survives, there is no interest
for the will to transmit.") (footnote omitted).
56. See R. Boyer, supra note 43, at 433; Cunningham, supra note I. at 732: 6A R.
Powell, supra note 43. 891, at 81-97.
57. See Doe v. Knight, 5 B. & C. 671, 692, 108 Eng. Rep. 250. 257 (K.B. 1826)
(When a party to an instrument seals it and declares in the presence of a witne.s,% that lie
delivers it as his deed, but keeps it in his possession, and there is nothing to qualify that.
or to show that the executing party did not intend it to operate immediately. except the
keeping of the deed in his hands, it is a valid and effectual delivery.): 3 American Law of
Property, supra note 43, § 12.64, at 313 ("Where intent that the deed %hall operate at
once is proven, physical delivery becomes unnecessary.") (footnote omitted).
58. Co. Litt. *36a.
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of the law.59 We infer or deduce intent from behavior. Thus, retention
of the deed by the grantor justifies a presumption or inference of nonde-
livery, which is seldom overcome.6° Conversely, we are justified in
presuming or inferring delivery from the grantee's possession of the
deed.61
Recordation by either the grantor or grantee, though not necessary for
a valid conveyance,62 raises a presumption or inference that the deed was
delivered.63 A far more complex problem is presented by a joint tenant's
secret severance deed that is not recorded until after his death.'
B. Intent and Failure to Record Inter Vivos
Most courts that have considered the validity of secret severance trans-
actions have ignored the delivery and recordation issue entirely.65 Those
courts that have considered the issue have failed to analyze the unex-
plained secrecy of the severance transaction and the failure to record the
severance instruments in holding that there was an effective delivery.66
A relatively recent Colorado case presents a recurring fact pattern.67
59. Compare 3 American Law of Property, supra note 43, § 12.64, at 312 and W.
Burby, supra note 1, at 294 (delivery "will suffice if the grantor evidences by word or
conduct an intention that the deed be operative") and Boyer, supra note 43, at 415 (gran-
tor's use of deed may be evidence of his intention) with 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence §§ 300-
307, 371 (discussing general principles of evidence of knowledge, design, and intent in
criminal and civil cases).
60. See 3 American Law of Property, supra note 43, § 12.64, at 314; W. Burby, supra
note 1, at 295-96; Cunningham, supra note 1, at 732; 6A R. Powell, supra note 43, 891,
at 81-106.
61. See 3 American Law of Property, supra note 43, § 12.64, at 314; W. Burby, supra
note 1, at 295-96; Cunningham, supra note 1, at 732; 6A R. Powell, supra note 43, 891,
at 81-106.
62. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
63. See 3 American Law of Property, supra note 43, § 12.64, at 313; W. Burby, supra
note 1, at 293, 296; Cunningham, supra note 1, at 733-34; 6A R. Powell, supra note 43, 1
891, at 81-104.
64. None of the authorities discuss this problem or raise a presumption of a lack of
present intent to sever from failure to record the joint tenant's deed during his lifetime.
See, e.g., 3 American Law of Property, supra note 43, § 12.64, at 313; R. Boyer, supra
note 43, at 415-18; W. Burby, supra note 1, at 294; Cunningham, supra note I, at 733-34.
65. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Chandler, 140 Cal. App. 3d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 651 (1983);
Dean v. Auble, 109 Cal. App. 3d 156, 167 Cal. Rptr. 138 (1980); Riddle v. Harmon, 102
Cal. App. 3d 524, 162 Cal. Rptr. 530 (1980); Delanoy v. Delanoy, 216 Cal. 23, 13 P.2d
513 (1932); Johnson v. Johnson, 11111. App. 3d 681, 297 N.E.2d 285 (1973): Hendrick-
son v. Minneapolis Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 281 Minn. 462, 161 N.W.2d 688 (1968);
Williamson v. Williamson, 90 R.I. 233, 157 A.2d 110, (1960); Schimke v. Karlstad, 87
S.D. 349, 208 N.W.2d 710 (1973).
66. See Burke v. Stevens, 264 Cal. App. 2d 30, 35, 70 Cal. Rptr. 87, 91 (1968) (se-
crecy and failure to record irrelevant in determination of effective delivery) Carmack v.
Place, 188 Colo. 303, 305-06, 535 P.2d 197. 198-99 (1975) (en banc) (same).
67. See. e.g., Meyer v. Wall, 270 Cal. App. 2d 24, 75 Cal. Rptr. 236 (1969) (spouse
secretly conveyed interest in joint tenancy property to child): Delanoy v. Delanoy. 216
Cal. 23, 13 P.2d 513 (1932) (spouse secretly conveyed interest in joint tenancy property to
mother), Carmack v. Place, 188 Colo. 303, 535 P.2d 197 (1975) (en banc) (spouse secretly
conveyed interest in joint tenancy property to child); Williamson v. Williamson. 90 R.I.
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In Carmack v. Place,6 the spouses acquired their family residence prop-
erty in 1946 and occupied it as husband and wife until their deaths in
1971, H having predeceased his wife by three months. 69 Four years ear-
lier, H had executed a deed conveying his undivided one-half interest in
the property to his daughter, D.7 ° W had no knowledge of the deed,
which was not recorded until six days after H's death. 7 Holding that
the 1967 deed from H to D severed the joint tenancy, the court's entire
discussion of the delivery and recordation issue was as follows:
[I]n Colorado the failure to record a deed until after the grantor's
death has no effect upon an otherwise valid conveyance.
Although at the trial level, [W's executor] denied delivery of the
deed, he presented no evidence to rebut the presumption of delivery
arising from recordation of the deed. Upon recording, this rebuttable
presumption relates back to the date of the execution of the deed.72
It is true, as the court states, that the failure to record an othenvise
valid deed prior to the death of the grantor does not affect its validity. 7"
No state recording statute requires recordation prior to the grantor's
death.74 For that matter, there is no requirement that the deed be re-
corded at all. 5 It is also true that recordation of a deed results in a
presumption of a present intent to pass title.76 But to indulge a presump-
tion of delivery related back to the date of the deed from a recordation
after the grantor's death when we know that the deed was secretly exe-
cuted, was kept secret for four years from the grantor's spouse of over
twenty years, and was secretly deposited somewhere other than with the
recorder of deeds, makes it impossible to raise an inference, or even a
suggestion, of a lack of intent to pass title at the date of the deed.
Each of the court's statements of law can be supported by abundant
case, text and treatise authority.77 And each of these statements are
sound propositions of law intended to support the integrity of the con-
veyancing process and the recording system. That is the reason, no
doubt, why none of the commentators treat the failure to record as a
basis for a presumption or inference against delivery. 78 The problem
here is that the wooden application of these conveyancing and recording
233, 157 A.2d 110 (1960) (same); Schimke v. Karlstad, 87 S.D. 349, 208 N.W.2d 710
(1973) (spouse secretly conveyed interest in joint tenancy property to children).
68. 188 Colo. 303, 535 P.2d 197 (1975) (en banc).
69. Id. at 304, 535 P.2d at 198.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 305, 535 P.2d at 198 (citations omitted) (brackets not in original).
73. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
77. See supra notes 44, 63 and accompanying text.
78. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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principles is wholly inappropriate in the context of the secret joint ten-
ancy severance transaction.
At least one court has seen a relationship between the failure to record
until after the grantor's death and the requisite intent for an effective
inter vivos conveyance. In Blackburn v. Drake,79 the court stated that,
though the failure to record until after the death of the grantor "in and of
itself does not vitiate delivery or the intent to make a present transfer...
[it] is a circumstance for the court to consider with the other circum-
stances surrounding the transaction in ascertaining whether the grantor
intended the deed to be presently operative." 0
Only in cases like Blackburn v. Drake, where the severance transaction
involves a purported conveyance to a third person, has the lack of intent
for the deed to operate presently been argued successfully to defeat the
secret deed.8" It has never been argued successfully in a strawman or
single instrument severance transaction.8" Yet, in both cases, the ques-
tion of intent remains the same-whether the severing spouse intended to
effect an immediate destruction of joint tenancy ownership83 or whether
he intended his instrument to be operative only upon his death. 4 Fur-
ther, in both cases, the danger of fraud and the incentive to perpetrate
fraud are the same.
Take the case of a secret conveyance by H to D, his daughter by a
previous marriage. W, H's wife, dies first. Will D resist her father's re-
quest that she return the deed so that he can claim the property abso-
lutely as surviving joint tenant? 5 Or will she insist that her deed now be
79. 211 Cal. App. 2d 806, 27 Cal. Rptr. 651 (1963).
80. Id. at 814, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 656 (citations omitted). See also Meyer v. Wall, 270
Cal. App. 2d 24, 75 Cal. Rptr. 236 (1969) (court considers failure to record as one factor
indicating non-delivery of deed); Mecchi v. Picchi, 245 Cal. App. 2d 470, 483, 54 Cal.
Rptr. 1, 8 (1966) (failure to record a deed until after the death of a grantor supports, but
does not compel, a finding of non-delivery).
81. See, e.g., Meyer v. Wall, 270 Cal. App. 2d 24, 75 Cal. Rptr. 236 (1969); Black-
burn v. Drake, 211 Cal. App. 2d 806, 27 Cal. Rptr. 651 (1963); Klajbor v. Klajbor, 406
Ill. 513, 94 N.E.2d 502 (1950).
82. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Chandler, 140 Cal. App. 3d 709, 712, 189 Cal. Rptr. 651,
653 (1983); Dean v. Auble, 109 Cal. App. 3d 156, 167 Cal. Rptr. 138 (1980); Riddle v.
Harmon, 102 Cal. App. 3d 524, 162 Cal. Rptr. 530 (1980); Burke v. Stevens, 264 Cal.
App. 2d 30, 70 Cal. Rptr. 87 (1968); Johnson v. Johnson, 11 Ill. App. 3d 681, 297 N.E.2d
285 (1973); Hendrickson v. Minneapolis Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n., 281 Minn. 462, 161
N.W.2d 688 (1968).
83. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
84. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
85. In Klouda v. Pechousek, 414 Ill. 75, 110 N.E.2d 258 (1953), H and W owned
certain real property registered under the Torrens Act as joint tenants. Id. at 77, 110
N.E.2d at 260. Wwas H's third wife. Id. at 78, 110 N.E.2d at 261. Two years before his
death, H executed and delivered a quitclaim deed of his interest to D, one of his six
children by a previous marriage. Id. The deed purported to grant H's interest to all six
children as joint tenants. Id. The deed contained the provision: "This deed not to be
recorded and not take effect until my death." Id. The reason for this provision was that,
because W had possession of the Torrens certificate, H could not keep the deed a secret
from W if lie attempted to register it. See id. at 87, 110 N.E.2d at 265. D testified "that
she would have given the deeds back to the grantor if he had asked for them." d. at 83.
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recorded so that she or her stepmother's devisees can bring a partition
action to have the house sold, receive her one-half share of the proceeds
of the sale and have her father evicted from possession of his home?
Since D participated in the secret conveyance and the lack of recordation,
is it reasonable to expect her now to have a sudden attack of candor and
honesty?8 6
The difference between these attempted testamentary dispositions is
that in the single and straw party severance transactions, the severing
joint tenant is more in control of his affairs, his secret is better kept and
the temptation to destroy the severance instrument or instruments is al-
most irresistible. It would seem, therefore, that the failure to record the
severance deed prior to the severing joint tenant's death is even more
probative of a lack of present intent in the single party and straw party
transactions than in third party transactions.
C. A Case in Point
The case of Burke v. Stevens,87 which has gone unnoticed or ignored
for almost two decades,88 best illustrates the typical circumstances in
which secret severance transactions take place and the shocking failure of
courts to perceive and to remedy a problem that is inimical to joint ten-
ant title stability. In Burke, H and W purchased the property in dispute
as joint tenants in 1941.89 Sometime before or during the month of June,
1960, H informed W that, should she die first, he would dispose of the
joint tenancy property as he wished.9" It was this conversation that
prompted Wto write to her personal attorney, Mr. Natzke, in June, 1960
110 N.E.2d at 263 (emphasis added). Because the initial delivery of deed was not so
conditioned, her statement was considered irrelevant. The court held that there was a
valid delivery of deed and that the effect of the provision against "recording" until after
the grantor's death constituted a present transfer of the fee title to his children and a
reservation of a life estate in the grantor. See id. at 88-89, 110 N.E.2d at 266.
86. Even if H and D had a serious falling out, she could insist that H convey to her a
one-half interest in the property as a precondition to returning the deed. Thus, D could
receive a one-half interest in the property either upon return of the deed to H or upon
recordation of her deed. If she chose the former, she would preserve H's one half-interest
in the property without affecting her interest. If she chose the latter, however, she would
extinguish H's interest in the property while preserving her interest. Given the preserva-
tion of her interest in either case and in view of her prior cooperation with H in the
transaction, she would appear to have little incentive to refuse H's request to return the
deed. H could then destroy the deed, claim as surviving joint tenant, and D would still
take the interest she would have taken under the original severance deed.
87. 264 Cal. App. 2d 30, 70 Cal. Rptr. 87 (1968).
88. See, e.g., 2 American Law of Property, supra note 1I, § 6.2, at 160-61 n.19 (Supp.
1977); R. Boyer, supra note 43, 80-88; 0. Browder, R. Cunningham & A. Smith, Basic
Property Law, 301-04, 307-15 (4th ed. 1984); A. Casner & W. Leach, Cases and Text on
Property 254 (3d ed. 1984); J. Cribbet & C. Johnson, supra note 44, at 338-42; Cunning-
ham, supra note I, §§ 5.3-5.4; C. Donahue, T. Kauper & P. Martin, Property 621-28 (2d
ed. 1983); J. Dukeminier & J. Krier, Property 487-530 (1981), 4A R. Powell, supra note
1, 615-619[2], at 51-1 to -18.
89. Burke v. Stevens, 264 Cal. App. 2d 30, 33, 70 Cal. Rptr. 87, 90 (1968).
90. Id. at 32-33, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 90.
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regarding certain testamentary dispositions she wished to make of her
separate property in the event of her death.9 Her letter stated her belief
that, because the real property was held in joint tenancy, the survivor
would take all and there was nothing she could do about it.92
There was no mention of any further communication between W and
her attorney until approximately four months later when W wrote a let-
ter to him, dated October 2, 1960, directing him to "prepare a power of
attorney for her execution, naming him as her attorney in fact, and di-
recting him to terminate the joint tenancy."93 No mention was made of
how W acquired the legal knowledge sufficient to give such directions.94
On the same day, she executed and delivered the power of attorney pur-
suant to her letter95 and executed her last will and testament, naming
Mr. Natzke executor thereof.96 The court did not explain how W's let-
ter, dated October 2, 1960, could have been dispatched by W, and re-
ceived by Mr. Natzke, so as to allow him sufficient time to "hatch" the
"secret plan to terminate the joint tenancy,"' 97 prepare the power of at-
torney and have W execute the same, all on October 2, 1960. Unless the
dates were confused, it appears that the letter, the power of attorney and
W's will all were prepared, executed and delivered contemporaneously.
To terminate the joint tenancy, Mr. Natzke executed and delivered a
quitclaim deed on October 5, 1960, conveying W's interest to Mr. Mo-
ran, his law office associate. 98 The next day, the associate conveyed his
interest back to W. 9 Contrary to normal conveyancing practices,'00 the
deeds were not recorded immediately.' 0 ' Thus, the failure to record ap-
peared to be deliberate. Yet, Mr. Natzke must have known that the
transaction would have remained secret even if the deeds had been re-
corded immediately. The chance that H would cause a search to be
made of the records of property he owned for twenty years and thereby
discover the secret severance deeds was virtually nil.' 0 2 Failure to rec-
91. See id. at 34, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 90.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 32, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 89.
94. See id. at 32-34, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 89-90.
95. See id. at 32, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 89.
96. See id. at 33, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 90.
97. Id. at 32, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 89 ("This secret plan to terminate the joint tenancy was
hatched pursuant to a letter from Mrs. Burke to Mr. Natzke.").
98. Id. at 32, 35, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 89, 91.
99. Id. at 32, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 89.
100. See Cunningham, supra note 1, at 776.
101. Burke v. Stevens, 264 Cal. App. 2d 30, 34-35, 70 Cal. Rptr. 87, 91 (1968).
102. The following cases illustrate that an owner of property, either individually or as
a co-owner, has no reason to examine his record title once he has recorded the deed
conveying title to himself. Recordation of a severance deed is not intended to give the
other joint tenant notice or constructive notice. He is not a subsequent purchaser.
In Hockett v. Larson, 742 F.2d 1123 (8th Cir. 1984), H conveyed property owned by
himself and W as joint tenants, signing his own name and forging W's signature to the
deed. Id. at 1124. Although the deed was recorded immediately after conveyance by H,
W did not know of the conveyance until after H's death, three years later, in 1979. Id.
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ord, however, would allow the deed to be discovered and given effect
only upon the death of W.
Both of the deeds and W's will were kept in Ws attorney's offices. 03
Her will devised her interest in the property to her two sons by a previ-
ous marriage, subject to a life estate that she left to H.11 H, of course,
learned of the secret conveyances only after W's death almost two years
The court held that the deed effectively transferred H's interest in the property and sev-
ered the joint tenancy, leaving W as a tenant in common as to her undivided one-half
interest. Id. at 1126.
In Lonergan v. Strom, 145 Ariz. 195, 700 P.2d 893 (1985), H and IV were under a
preliminary injunction in an annulment proceeding instituted by H not to "transfer, en-
cumber, conceal, sell, or otherwise dispose of" joint tenancy property "without the writ-
ten consent of both parties or the permission of the court." Id. at 197, 700 P.2d at 895.
While the preliminary injunction was still in effect, H's attorney effected a strawman
exchange of deeds between H and the attorney's legal secretary for the sole purpose of
severing the joint tenancy title to certain property owned by H and IV as joint tenants.
Id. at 197, 700 P.2d at 895. The deed was recorded, but IV did not learn of the strawman
severance deeds until after H's death seven months later, which was three months after
judgment was entered in W's favor in the annulment proceeding. The court held that the
severance was not the type of "transfer" against which the injunction was issued. Id. at
198-200, 700 P.2d at 896-98. Hence, "the legality of the straw party transaction by which
the husband sought to terminate the joint tenancy between himself and his wife was not
subject to question." Id. at 198, 700 P.2d at 896.
In Clark v. Carter, 265 Cal. App. 2d 291, 70 Cal. Rptr. 923 (1968), IV executed a single
party severance deed and an assignment the day before she died. Id. at 293, 70 Cal. Rptr.
at 925. The deed was recorded three days after W's death. Id. Three months later, H,
unaware of the severance deed, its recordation, or even W's death, filed an "affidavit
terminating the joint tenancy which he believed existed." Id. at 293, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 925.
It is significant that H, even at the time that he filed an instrument which he believed
would sever the joint tenancy, did not cause a search of the title to discover whether I"
might have filed an earlier severance instrument. The court held that the single party
severance deeds were invalid and did not terminate the joint tenancy. See id. at 296, 70
Cal. Rptr. at 927.
In Register v. Coleman, 130 Ariz. 9, 633 P.2d 418 (1981), a mother who had owned
her residence property in fee simple caused the property to be transferred to herself and
her son as joint tenants. Id. at 11, 633 P.2d at 420. In 1971, the mother transferred her
interest by quitclaim deed to her daughters and had the deed immediately recorded. Id.
The son claimed he did not know of the recorded deed from his mother to the daughters
until after his mother's death in 1975. Despite the son's lack of knowledge, the court held
that the joint tenancy was severed by the mother's quitclaim deed. See id. at 12, 633 P.2d
at 421.
A similar case is Minonk State Bank v. Grassman, 95 I11. 2d 392, 447 N.E.2d 822
(1983), aff'g 103 Il1. App. 3d 1106, 432 N.E.2d 386 (1982). Three sisters owned property
conveyed to them by their father as joint tenants. Id. at 393, 447 N.E.2d at 823. After
the death of one of the three sisters, a surviving sister executed and recorded her sever-
ance deed. Id. Five years later, the non-severing joint tenant died, apparently still una-
ware of the recorded severance deed. Id. The court held that the single party deed had
effectively severed the joint tenancy. See id. at 395-96, 447 N.E.2d at 824.
It seems that a recorded severance deed kept secret from the non-severing joint tenant
is just as secret as one that is not recorded at all. How frequently and at what expense is a
joint tenant going to search his title? A search today is worthless as to a recordation
tomorrow, and a search tomorrow is worthless as to a recordation the next day, ad
infinitum.
103. Burke v. Stevens, 264 Cal. App. 2d 30, 35, 70 Cal. Rptr. 87, 91 (1968).




In H's subsequent action to quiet title, the California Court of Appeals
held that the secret strawman transaction was effective to sever the joint
tenancy. °6 The court characterized the transaction as a "secret plan to
terminate the joint tenancy,"'' 0 7 that was "devised and carried out"'0° by
Mr. Natzke and Mr. Moran. Despite the attorneys' evident familiarity
and W's apparent lack of familiarity with the law, the court attributed to
W clear directions that she had given to her "attorney that complete
secrecy was to be maintained."'0 9 Further, the court stated that the
wife's actions were "subject to ethical criticism" and that "her stealthy
approach to the solution of the problems facing her [was] not to be ac-
claimed," especially in view of the generous trust reposed in her by her
husband."o
The court sustained the trial court's finding of a valid and effective
delivery,"' stating that "[i]nasmuch as two attorneys, presumably famil-
iar with the law relating to joint tenancy, devised and carried out this
course of action, the intent to pass title to one-half of the joint tenancy
property was present in connection with the delivery of the first deed."" 2
This line of reasoning is circular. It leads irresistibly to the conclusion
that in all strawman severance conveyances, the present intent to cause a
severance of the joint tenancy exists. The only purpose for the transac-
tion is to sever the joint tenancy. The transaction itself is proof of the
requisite intent. The same logic necessarily applies to single party sever-
ance deeds and to "Declarations of Intent to Sever."'  The only pur-
pose for executing these instruments is to cause a severance and to
destroy survivorship rights. Thus, they too are executed with the present
intent to effect their only purpose. To hold otherwise, so this line of
reasoning would argue, would be to attribute to the severing joint tenant
the performance of a meaningless and useless act.
But by focusing only on the severance transaction, divorced from the
surrounding circumstances, the court loses sight of the issue entirely-
whether the severance transaction was intended to effect an immediate
destruction of joint tenancy ownership between the spouses.' 4 Whatever
the form of the severance transaction and no matter how scrupulously
each detail of the severance ceremony is attended and fulfilled, the sine
qua non of the transaction still is intent. The form of a transaction has
105. Id. at 33, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 90.
106. See id. at 34-35, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 91.
107. Id. at 32, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 89.
108. Id. at 35, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 91.
109. Id. at 34, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 90.
110. Id. at 34, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 91.
111. See id. at 35, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 91.
112. Id. at 35, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 91.
113. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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never prevented the courts from piercing the most formal of legalistic
inventions to address the substance and fairness of human behavior.
Burke v. Stevens' 15 is the only secret severance case in which counsel
argued that the secret severance transaction is a fertile environment for
the fraudulent destruction of survivorship rights. Emphasizing that the
unrecorded severance deeds were kept in the office of W's attorney, H's
counsel argued that "if [H] had died first nothing would have been said
about the deeds passing between [W] through Mr. Natzke and Mr. Mo-
ran and that, in such circumstances, [W] would become apparent owner




The court failed to appreciate the relationship between the issue of
present intent to effect a severance and the intentional failure to record
the severance deed and dismissed the argument out of hand."" "The
mere fact that a wrong of this kind is imaginable," said the court, "can-
not be used to counter the fact that the joint tenancy was legally termi-
nated." '1 18 The court stated that fraud could not be contingently
assumed. 19 Not a shred of evidence supported the suggestion that "two
reputable attorneys and a citizen" would conspire to conceal the truth
and commit a wrong.12' Rather, the nefarious scenario suggested by
counsel was "pure guess" and "contrary to the presumption of fair deal-
ing."' 12 ' Having rejected the notion that the behavior of W and her attor-
neys might merit further scrutiny, the court disposed of the case by
reciting a litany of propositions of law with wooden, syllogistic logic.122
What the court failed to see, or refused to appreciate, was the stubborn
reality that whether the secret severance transaction was pursuant to a
fraudulent scheme or whether it was innocent, W and her attorney would
have been faced with the same dilemma upon H's death: "Should we
now come forward and inform the executor or administrator of H's es-
tate [probably W herself] that W severed the joint tenancy two years
ago? If we do, H's estate assets will include a one-half interest in the
property which H believed he owned as a joint tenant until the day he
115. 264 Cal. App. 2d 30, 70 Cal. Rptr. 87 (1968).
116. See id. at 35-36, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 91.
117. Seeid.
118. Id. at 36, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 92.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 36, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 92.
121. Id. at 36, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 91-92.
122. The court explained that:
It was unnecessary in connection with the execution of such a deed that there
should be notification to the other joint tenant and unnecessary that the deed be
recorded; neither acknowledgement or recordation is necessary. It is not neces-
sary that the consent to termination of joint tenancy be obtained from the other
joint tenant. None of these things was done, but it was not essential that any of
them should be effected. The deed passed immediate title to Mr. Moran, and
when he in turn deeded the same interest in the land to [W], that deed was also
effective.
Id. at 35, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 91 (brackets not in original).
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died, subject to W's survivorship right. Or, should we forget about all of
those documents that W executed?"
If the 1960 secret severance transaction were intended to effect a sever-
ance at that time, and if the deliberate failure to record were solely for
the purpose of maintaining the secrecy of the severance transaction, then
destruction or concealment of the deeds would constitute a fraudulent
taking of H's one-half interest in the property. 23 If, on the other hand,
the failure to record the severance deeds were pursuant to a plan to effect
a severance only if W died first, then the destruction of the straw party
severance deeds would not be fraudulent. Having failed to serve their
intended purpose, there no longer would be any reason to retain them. If
this were W's intent, and if this were the reason for not recording the
deeds, then the severance transaction would be an invalid attempted tes-
tamentary disposition.'24 W either intended her severance deed to oper-
ate immediately or she intended it to operate only upon her death, not
both.
If, as the Burke court stated, "[o]ne cannot contingently assume
fraud,"' 25 are we not justified in assuming that unrecorded severance
deeds are executed with the intent to effect a severance only if the sever-
ing joint tenant dies first? It is one thing to indulge the "presumption of
fair dealing" in a secret severance transaction so as not to charge the
parties with a present intent to perpetrate a future fraud, but it is alto-
gether different to stubbornly adhere to that presumption when it is con-
trary to the facts and human behavior. A person, otherwise scrupulously
honest, is likely to be less than honest if he is assured of a substantial
financial gain without risk that his less than honest behavior will be re-
vealed. It defies reason to assume that the straw-party deeds would ever
have been produced if H had died first. The only way we can conform
the presumption of fair dealing with reality is to assume that W and her
attorney intended the severance deeds to operate only in the event that W
dies first. If that was W's intent, the secret severance transaction fails as
an invalid attempted testamentary disposition.
III. A STATUTORY SOLUTION
Although there is a perfectly sound argument for raising a presump-
tion of a lack of present intent to sever from the failure to record the
severing joint tenant's deed during his lifetime, no such presumption has
123. As indicated by the court in Burke, such an act would be "a conspiracy to hide
the truth and commit a wrong" that, if actually intended by the attorneys, would consti-
tute "fraud." Id. at 36, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 92. Cf. 8 G. Thompson, supra note 51, § 4292
n.99 ("[T]he destruction of the deed before the recording of it, whether by accident or by
wrongful act of a third person, does not annihilate title... between the parties.") (empha-
sis added).
124. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
125. Burke v. Stevens, 264 Cal. App. 2d 30, 36, 70 Cal. Rptr. 87, 91 (1968).
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been recognized by courts' 26 or even suggested by commentators. -'2 7
Complete obliviousness to the issue, so palpably manifest in Burke v. Ste-
vens, characterizes too many other judicial opinions to anticipate accept-
ance of such a presumption by other courts, even if they might now be
persuaded that such a presumption was justified. It is doubtful, there-
fore, that such a presumption might be recognized at this late date. In
view of the court's analysis of the effectiveness of after-death recordation
of severance deeds in Carmack v. Place,128 Colorado courts might find it
impossible to raise even the slightest suggestion of a lack of present intent
to sever from the failure to record the severing joint tenant's deed prior
to his death.
It seems, therefore, that the solution to the problem should be statu-
tory. The statute should be one that fits comfortably into the whole
fabric of the conveyancing process, one that is not disruptive of the law
as applied to the delivery of deeds and to the recording statutes. It
should also leave the law intact as it applies to joint tenancy ownership of
real property. Three statutory formulations based, respectively, on rec-
ordation, notice and fraud, were considered before the wisdom of a
fourth formulation became apparent.
A. Recordation
It is always tempting to adopt a direct, absolute rule that is certain to
cure the perceived wrong in every possible variation of the wrongful
theme. Such a cure would be a rule that severance deeds shall be void
unless recorded during the severing joint tenant's lifetime. This cure,
however, poses several problems.
Suppose that you and your spouse have been engaged in a bitter and
protracted divorce proceeding. After learning that a polyp removed
from your large intestine was malignant, you turn your attention to your
financial affairs. Months ago you had prudently attended to your will.
Now disability and death have an element of immediacy to you. Because
you practice law in California, Illinois or some other state that recognizes
single-party severance deeds, you execute such a deed and have it ac-
knowledged by a secretary who has served you in that capacity hundreds
of times before. You are headed out the door to record the deed when
one of your associates rushes into the office and informs you that your
spouse was just killed in an automobile accident. Your next move? If
you are starting to feel less honest than you thought you were, let me
suggest that you read or re-read Mark Twain's The Man that Corrupted
Hadleyburg. 129
126. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
127. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
128. 188 Colo. 303, 535 P.2d 197 (1975) (en banc). See supra notes 68-72 and accom-
panying text.
129. Mark Twain's classic short story is about a self-righteous town whose only claim
to fame was in its cultivated reputation for honesty. A stranger's diabolic ruse corrupted
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Is there any doubt that you intended your deed on execution to be
immediately operative? Had you, rather than your estranged spouse,
been killed in an automobile accident on the way to the Office of the
Recorder of Deeds, your deed should still be valid. That you probably
would have destroyed the deed upon your spouse's hypothetically unex-
pected death, does not erase the fact that you intended to sever the joint
tenancy. Nothing in your behavior suggests the fraudulent scheme here
addressed. Although the requirement of recordation during the lifetime
of the severing joint tenant would slam the door on spousal fraud on
survivorship rights, it would also defeat bona fide severance transactions
and deathbed severance deeds.
Furthermore, such a statute would not fit into the fabric of the convey-
ancing process. No state has recording statutes under which the validity
of a deed is dependant upon its recordation. 3 ' If validity of a severance
deed were dependent upon its recordation during the lifetime of the gran-
tor, it would stand alone in the law of conveyancing.
B. Notice
Another possible solution is to require notification. Some commenta-
tors have concluded that secret severance unfairly deprives the other
joint tenant of an awareness of his right to provide for the transmission of
his interest by will. They recommend that the legal effectiveness of the
severance transaction be conditioned on notice.13 One commentator ob-
served that "[t]his would ensure that the nonsevering spouse will not rely
on survivorship rights but will be aware of the need to make proper dis-
position of the property."' 132
The same commentator cautioned, however, that "this would create
timing and proof problems." 133 Further, where the spouses are separated
it might be difficult to locate the unknowing spouse. Another commenta-
tor who recommends notification suggests that, under such circum-
stances "the only notice that may be possible could be constructive notice
via recordation of the termination instrument."' 134 Constructive notice is
all nineteen of the town's leading citizens by the lure of a fortune in bogus gold coins and
his promise that their false claims to the fortune would not be revealed. See M. Twain,
The Man That Corrupted Hadleyburg, in The Complete Short Stories of Mark Twain 349
(C. Neider ed. 1957).
130. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
131. See infra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
132. Sterling, Joint Tenancy and Community Property in California, 14 Pac. L.J. 927,
966 (1983).
133. Id.
134. Reppy, Debt Collection from Married Californians: Problems Caused by Trans-
mutations, Single-Spouse Management, and Invalid Marriage, 18 San Diego L. Rev. 143,
238 (1981).
By way of footnote, another commentator stated:
First Nat'l Bank v. Groussman, 29 Colo. App. 215, 483 P.2d 398, aff'd, 176
Colo. 566, 491 P.2d 1382 (1971) (octogenarian mother bought home with
daughter in joint tenancy; mother provided down payment and daughter as-
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unlikely to remedy the unfairness caused by the nonsevering party's lack
of awareness. Constructive notice is a euphemism for treating a person
who does not know something as if he does. Recordation under such
circumstances essentially hides something where everyone can see it but
where no one thinks to look. 135
A more serious problem with this solution lies in the uncertainty it
introduces into joint tenancy titles. Once title to property has been held
in joint tenancy, the prospective purchaser of a severed interest in that
property will be unable to determine from the record title whether the
severance deed is valid. Rejecting the claim that severance is dependent
upon notice, the court in Carnack v. Place 13 6 correctly observed that it
"would render the record extremely questionable whenever a severed
joint tenancy appears."' 137 The court noted that, "[i]n cases where both
of the former joint tenants are deceased... actual notice could be diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to prove."' 38
I have no problem with the law of joint tenancy in its maximization of
flexibility in survivorship rights. It is a form of property co-ownership
that assures survivorship rights and, at the same time, allows for sever-
ability. Severability is the "escape hatch" available to each joint tenant.
Whether he does or does not avail himself of his survivorship right is a
matter of choice. A formula for reform that in any way impairs or indi-
rectly suppresses those rights should be avoided. Better that we abolish
directly, rather than indirectly, this form of property ownership.
C. Intent
When the problem addressed by this Article first crossed my mind, my
immediate response was to propose a direct and obvious solution. The
obvious solution was a statute that would discourage secret severance
schemes by presuming fraudulent intent from the failure to record unless
clear and convincing evidence existed proving otherwise.' 9 But I have
sumed mortgage payments, but mother secretly conveyed her interest to
grandchildren seven years later, reserving life estate to herself). To prevent
cases like Groussinan, Professor Edward Rabin recommends that joint action be
required to terminate the survivorship feature. Conversation with Professor
Rabin, Davis, California (Summer, 1981). Because parties' needs and inten-
tions may change over time, however, the recommendation of this study would
instead permit unilateral action with notice, relying on estoppel and damages
doctrines to protect one who would thereby be unfairly prejudiced.
C. Bruch, The Definition and Division of Marital Property in California: Towards Parity
and Simplicity, 33 Hastings L.J. 769, 834 n.248 (1982). In another footnote, Professor
Bruch observed in passing: "Finally, if one secretly deeds to himself or herself, then
outlives the co-tenant, it would be a simple matter to destroy the unrecorded deed and
fraudulently take the property as a surviving joint tenant. See Burke v. Stevens ....- Id.
at 833 n.244.
135. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
136. 188 Colo. 303, 535 P.2d 197 (1975) (en banc).
137. Id. at 306, 535 P.2d at 199.
138. Id.
139. This statute could have taken the following form:
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now rejected this solution, not only because there is a better one, but
because it is too harsh and hence unworkable. Ironically, it was Burke v.
Stevens 40 that, upon reflection, convinced me to abandon the fraudulent
scheme analysis.
The problem with such a statute is that, as the Burke court stated,
"[o]ne cannot contingently assume fraud."'' It might very well be that,
as counsel implied in Burke, a spouse who executes and "delivers" a sev-
erance deed, but does not record it, intends to defraud his spouse by
destruction of the deed in the event that his spouse dies first.142 On the
other hand, at the time of execution of the severance deed, the thought of
the other spouse's prior death might not have even occurred to the sever-
ing joint tenant. His dominant motive and intent at the date of severance
might have been to assure himself that one-half the value of the joint
tenancy property would pass at his death to favored objects of his bounty
rather than to his spouse. His secrecy might very well be based upon a
fear of his spouse's power to use other legal maneuvers to frustrate his
plan and his fear of the law and lawyers generally. Here we have a per-
son whose initial perceptions of his rights in joint tenancy property own-
ership are so flawed that each "new" right or power revealed to him by
his own attorney might very well engender new fears as to what legal
tricks might be available to his spouse. He knows that once his spouse
learns that an attorney is helping him to arrange his affairs, his spouse
will retain an attorney to arrange his spouse's affairs. And his fear is that
his spouse's attorney may be even more clever than his attorney. Hence,
secrecy is to be maintained at all costs.
Moreover, the attorney's position is impossible. Even though the fail-
ure to record might initially have been wholly innocent, 43 the severing
spouse and his attorney cannot fail to grasp the implications of the other
spouse's death and realize that they put themselves in this position from
the start. This is especially true when the instrument or instruments of
severance have been held for safe keeping by the attorney. The attorney's
MODEL ACT
Section 2-101. Severance of Joint Tenancy. Persons Claiming Under Deceased
Joint Tenant's Unrecorded Deed or Other Instrument-Void Unless Failure to
Record Severance Deed Proved Not Fraudulent. An unrecorded deed or other
instrument otherwise effective to sever a joint tenant's interest in real property
shall be void as against the surviving joint tenant or tenants unless the person or
persons claiming under, by, or through such deed or other instrument prove by
clear and convincing evidence that the failure to record such deed or other in-
strument was not intended to defraud the surviving joint tenant or tenants of his
or their survivorship rights by destruction or concealment of said deed or other
instrument in the event that the surviving joint tenant or tenants died first.
140. 264 Cal. App. 2d 30, 70 Cal. Rptr 87 (1968).
141. Id. at 36, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 92.
142. Id. at 30, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 87.
143. When I say "wholly innocent," I merely mean that it might not be pursuant to a
fraudulent scheme. I do not mean that the secret severance transaction might serve sonic
legitimate, praiseworthy objective. Regardless of the motivation, he has deprived his
spouse of her survivorship right knowing that his spouse is relying upon the right.
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client, whose understanding of the whole transaction is probably still
flawed, will ask him to destroy the deed. That the attorney might have
failed to anticipate his now impossible position is sufficient to justify the
Burke court's conclusion that there was no evidence indicating that
"[W], Mr. Natzke and Mr. Moran would join in a conspiracy to hide the
truth and commit a wrong.' The attorney's legal, ethical, moral and
financial positions are complex, contradictory and compromised.' 45 A
statute that concludes fraudulent intent unless clear and convincing evi-
dence to the contrary be proven would be a strong deterrent. It might,
however, put attorneys in serious jeopardy of disciplinary proceedings
that would be difficult to defend against and where their only transgres-
sions might be in their failure to exercise good judgment and professional
prudence.
Nevertheless, secret severance transactions pose a grave threat to joint
tenancy title stability that must be eliminated. A joint tenant who has
devised or accepted an arrangement to assure secrecy has gained an ad-
vantage never intended by the common law. The law permits a joint
tenant to sever without the consent or even the knowledge of the other
joint tenant to assure that his right and ability to sever is absolute and
unfettered.' 46 That is why he may sever without giving notice to the
other joint tenant, not because the policy of the common law is to pro-
mote the secret severance as one of the rights and advantages of joint
tenancy ownership.
In every secret severance transaction, the possibility exists that the
nonsevering spouse will die first. Whether the failure to record is pursu-
ant to a fraudulent scheme or whether it is innocent, once the severing
joint tenant, either alone or with his attorney, is faced with the prior
death of the nonsevering joint tenant, he cannot avoid being aware of his
power to claim as surviving joint tenant simply by destroying the unre-
corded severance deed. Further, the ability to gain a substantial financial
advantage by behavior not likely ever to see the light of day inevitably
invites such behavior and triggers every conceivable variety of rationali-
zation to justify such behavior. Are we not justified, therefore, in con-
cluding that an unrecorded severance instrument will be discovered only
if the severing joint tenant dies first? In other words, it seems fair to
presume that the severing joint tenant who fails to record intends for his
severance deed to operate only if he dies first-an attempted testamen-
tary disposition.
If we address the realities of secret, unrecorded severance transactions,
the model statute here proposed should commend itself.
144. Burke v. Stevens, 264 Cal. App. 2d 30, 70 Cal. Rptr. 87, 91 (1968).
145. See generally Model Code of Professional Responsibility Canon 4 (1980) ("A law-
yer should preserve the confidences and secrets of a client"); id. Canon 7 ("A lawyer
should represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law").




Section 2-101. Severance of Joint Tenancy. Persons Claiming under
Deceased Joint Tenant's Unrecorded Deed or other Instrument-Void
as Testamentary in Character Unless Proven Otherwise.
An unrecorded deed or other instrument otherwise effective to sever
a joint tenant's interest in real property shall be void 147 unless the per-
son or persons claiming under, by or through such deed or other in-
strument prove by clear and convincing evidence that such unrecorded
deed or other instrument was intended to take effect irrespective of
which of the joint tenants dies first.
The proposed statute leaves intact the joint tenant's absolute right to
sever his interest from joint tenancy ownership and thereby terminate
both spouses' survivorship rights. His unilateral severance right is not
dependant upon notice to his spouse. Whether or not he chooses to in-
form his spouse of the severance, for whatever reason or for no reason at
all, is a matter between him and his spouse. Even if secrecy is desired,
the joint tenant can record his severance instrument, thereby taking his
transaction beyond the purview of the statute, and still maintain secrecy.
Though recordation might disclose his secret, it is highly unlikely to do
SO.
1 4 8
While retaining all the advantages of joint tenancy contemplated by
the common law, the Model Act would remove all incentive for delay in
recording an instrument intended to effect an immediate severance and
destruction of survivorship rights. The spouse is forced to choose be-
tween exercising his right of unilateral severance and taking his chances
"upon success in the ultimate gamble-survival-and then only if the
unity of the estate has not theretofore been destroyed by ... action which
operates to sever the joint tenancy."' 49
The statute would encourage the attorney to attend to the recordation
of the severance deeds with the same attention he gives to all other deeds
in the ordinary course of his real estate practice. He is given a statutory
reason to refuse a client's request to sever the client's interest from joint
tenancy ownership without prompt recordation. Otherwise, the attorney
can explain, he could be held liable for malpractice by the client's disap-
pointed devisees or distributees should the client die first.150
147. An alternative formulation would be to insert after "shall be void" the phrase -as
an attempted testamentary disposition or as an attempted intestate distribution."
148. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
149. Riddle v. Harmon, 102 Cal. App. 3d 524, 526-27, 162 Cal. Rptr. 530, 531 (1980)
(quoting Tenhet v. Boswell, 18 Cal. 3d 150, 155-56, 554 P.2d 330, 334, 133 Cal. Rptr. 10.
14 (1976)).
150. Consider the situation of an attorney who has been in possession of his client'%
unrecorded severance deeds for several years, as was the case in Burke v. Stevens, 264
Cal. App. 2d 30, 70 Cal. Rptr. 87 (1968). What would happen under the Model Act if his
client dies first? If the deeds were recorded after his client's death and the client's devi-
sees claimed an interest in the property under the will, it would seem impossible for them
to prevail. They would have to prove that the severance deeds were not invalid as an
attempted testamentary disposition. It is likely that under such circumstances, the attor-
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Fraudulent destruction of secret severance deeds can neither be pre-
vented nor discovered. This Model Act, however, provides a potent dis-
incentive for their existence in the first place and is, therefore,
respectfully commended to the several state legislatures and to the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
CONCLUSION
It is with some trepidation that I publish this Article. I know of two
other instances where the authors of law review articles proposed solu-
tions to a problem where there was no general awareness that such a
problem even existed until the articles were published and read. Both
might have exacerbated the problem rather than contributed to its
solution.
In 1905, Albert Martin Kales, a brilliant young law professor at
Northwestern University Law School, published an article in the Law
Quarterly Review. 5' In that same year, the Article was reprinted as a
chapter of his treatise on the Illinois law of estates and future interests. t52
In 1967, I published an article in the Arkansas Law Review. 53 The the-
ses of both Articles argued against judicial acceptance of the common
law rule of destructibility of contingent remainders.154 Both Articles an-
alyzed case authority, 155 and respectively concluded that in Illinois
(Kales), 5 6 and in Arkansas (Fetters),' 1" there were sufficient precedents
for the supreme courts of the respective states to hold that destructibility
was not a part of the jurisprudence of either state should the issue of
destructibility ever be squarely raised on appeal.
Three years after the Kales publications, and two years after my Arti-
cle, the Supreme Courts of Illinois' 58 and Arkansas' 59 respectively de-
ney would be liable to the disappointed devisees for malpractice. Might the attorney in
such a position be tempted to destroy the severance deeds rather than record them? If he
did destroy them, then he would have to explain the meaningless devise in his deceased
client's will. He may find himself not only liable for malpractice, but also defending
himself against disbarment. What if the client had died intestate in the above case?
Might the attorney be tempted to destroy the severance deeds? He might, but then he
would have to worry about whether the severance transaction was really secret, not from
the surviving spouse-joint-tenant, but from anyone else who might refer the matter to the
character and fitness committee. Under the proposed statute, attorneys will attend to
recordation as promptly as the circumstances of the severance transaction permit.
Death-bed severance transactions will survive post-death recordations.
151. See Kales, Contingent Future Interests After a Particular Estate of Freehold, 21
L.Q.R. 118 (1905).
152. See A. Kales, Conditional and Future Interest and Illegal Conditions and Re-
straints (In Illinois) § 81-92(a), at 107-33 (1905).
153. See Fetters, Destructibility of Contingent Remainders, 21 Ark. L. Re%. 145 (1967).
154. See id. at 146-48, 163; Kales, supra note 150, at 119-20. 136-37.
155. See Fetters, supra note 152, at 150-59: Kales, supra note 148 at 129-36.
156. See Kales, supra note 150 at 137.
157. See Fetters, supra note 152 at 163.
158. See Bond v. Moore, 236 Ill. 576, 86 N.E. 386 (1908).
159. See Tucker v. Walker, 246 Ark. 177, 437 S.W.2d 788 (1969).
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cided cases in which destructibility was raised on appeal. Here ends the
similarity in the sagas of these two law review articles. In the famous
case of Bond v. Moore,'6 the Illinois Supreme Court held that the rule of
destructibility of contingent remainders was a part of the common law of
that state. Who represented the victorious appellant? None other than
Professor Kales. As a result, Illinois was saddled with a pernicious pre-
cedent that generated a flood of wasteful litigation' 6 ' until it finally was
abolished by statute in 1921.62
In the not at all famous case of Tucker v. Walker,'63 the Supreme
Court of Arkansas rejected the appellant's argument that he should pre-
vail by application of the destructibility rule."6 I suspect that my Article
might have stirred up this litigation as Kales' Article might have done in
Illinois. And I was delighted that the destructibility rule was not applied
to defeat the contingent remainder. But there my satisfaction ended for I
could not understand the majority opinion. I found myself just as befud-
dled as the concurring justice who stated, "I cannot tell whether the ma-
jority is rejecting or approving the doctrine [of destructibility of
contingent remainders]. The opinion does not relate the particular facts
which make the doctrine inapplicable."' 65
The destructibility Articles might have done more damage than good.
Had Kales and I "let sleeping dogs lie," the tens of cases that followed
might not have arisen. The tens or possibly hundreds of titles that might
have been adversely affected by the destructibility rule might have gone
unnoticed. Yet the problem raised in this Article is potentially far more
mischievous than were the destructibility articles. Millions, indeed, tens
of millions of land titles throughout the country might be unsettled by
arousing this sleeping dog.
My fear is that this Article might interest the wrong people. It, too,
proposes a solution to a problem where, apparently, there is no general
awareness that there is a problem. And it offers what some readers
might regard as a sensible solution. But my fear is that it might serve as
a "do-it-yourself" blueprint for wrongdoing-an invitation to commit
fraud.
Nonetheless, I feel reasonably confident that the solution to this prob-
lem will commend itself to law revision commissions and to the legisla-
tures. Otherwise, joint tenancy ownership of real property in this
country, with its extreme vulnerability to destruction of survivorship
rights by fraud, most assuredly will be avoided by sensible, prudent peo-
ple advised by competent counsel.
160. 236 Il1. 576, 86 N.E. 386 (1908).
161. The cases are collected in A. Kales, Estates, Future Interests and Illegal Re-
straints in Illinois § 310 n.58 (2d ed. 1920). See also Note, Seisin and Disseisin (Call-
cluded), 34 Harv. L. Rev. 717, 737 n.530 (1921).
162. See III. Ann. Stat. ch. 30, para. 40 (Smith-Hurd 1969).
163. 246 Ark. 177, 437 S.W.2d 788 (1969).
164. See id. at 180, 437 S.W.2d at 789.
165. Id. at 183, 437 S.W.2d at 791 (Fogelman, J.. concurring).
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